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We investigate the asymptotic security of one-way continuous variable quantum key distribution
against Gaussian two-mode coherent attacks. The one-way protocol is implemented by arranging the
channel uses in two-mode blocks. By applying symmetric random permutations over these blocks,
the security analysis is in fact reduced to study two-mode coherent attacks and, in particular,
Gaussian ones, due to the extremality of Gaussian states. We explicitly show that the use of
two-mode Gaussian correlations by an eavesdropper leads to asymptotic secret key rates which are
strictly larger than the rate obtained under standard single-mode Gaussian attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.-w, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum technologies are becoming reality, with huge
efforts being devoted to developing scalable quantum
computers and robust quantum communications, e.g., for
building a future quantum Internet [1–5]. In this global
scenario, quantum key distribution (QKD) [6–8] is cer-
tainly one of the most advanced areas, with intense re-
search activities directed towards practical implementa-
tions. QKD represents a set of strategies that, integrating
both quantum and classical communication, allow two
authorized remote users (Alice and Bob) to generate a
random sequence of bits; this is then used as an encryp-
tion key in a one-time pad protocol [9], therefore provid-
ing an unconditionally secure (information-theoretic [10])
private communication between the remote users.
The effectiveness of QKD relies on the ground rule of
encoding classical information in non-orthogonal quan-
tum states [12], that are then transmitted through a noisy
quantum channel controlled by the eavesdropper (Eve).
This is also equivalent to sending the “non-orthogonal
part” of discordant quantum states [13]. In this way,
Eve’s attack is bounded by fundamental laws of quan-
tum physics [11]: Any information gained by Eve cre-
ates loss and noise on the quantum channel. Thanks to
this trade-off, Alice and Bob can accurately quantify the
amount of classical error correction and privacy ampli-
fication needed to reduce Eve’s stolen information to a
negligible amount [6].
Since the first proposals to implement quantum in-
formation and computational tasks, continuous variable
(CV) systems have attracted increasing attention [14, 15].
The fact of using quantum systems with continuous spec-
tra (infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces) has several ad-
vantages with respect to the traditional approach based
on discrete variables (qubits). In particular, one can im-
plement QKD at high rates by using highly-modulated
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coherent states and homodyne detections, not only in
one-way schemes [16–21], but also in two-way proto-
cols [22–26] and CV strategies based on measurement-
device independence (MDI) [27–30]
Ideal implementations of CV-QKD provide the highest
key rates, not so far from the ultimate repeaterless bound
recently established in Ref. [31]. For a lossy channel
with transmissivity τ , the maximum rate achievable by
any QKD protocol (secret-key capacity) is equal to [31]
K = − log2(1 − τ), with a fundamental rate-loss scal-
ing of τ/ ln 2 ≃ 1.44τ bits per channel use for long dis-
tances, i.e., at high loss τ ≃ 0. The most practical one-
way CV-QKD protocols, i.e., the switching [16] and no-
switching [17] protocols, can potentially reach an asymp-
totic long-distance rate of τ/ ln 4 bits per use, which is
half the secret key capacity. Similar performance for CV-
MDI-QKD in the most asymmetric configuration [32].
In this work we deepen the study of the secret key
rates of the most known one-way CV-QKD protocols [16,
17]. In particular, we explicitly study their security in
the presence of Gaussian two-mode attacks, representing
the residual eavesdropping strategy after the de Finetti
symmetrization [33, 34] over two-mode blocks. Under
these attacks, we derive the analytical expressions of the
asymptotic key rates [35]. With these in hands, we show
that eavesdropping strategies based on correlated ancillas
turn out to be strictly less effective than Gaussian attacks
based on uncorrelated ancillas (single-mode attacks). In
other words, any two-mode Gaussian attack with strictly
non-zero correlations improves Alice and Bob’s key rate.
II. PROTOCOL AND GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Let us consider the communication scheme of Fig. 1(a).
Alice sends to Bob N ≫ 1 coherent states |αk〉. The
amplitudes αk, for k = 1, ..., N , are independently and
identically modulated by a bivariate zero mean Gaussian
distribution of variance µ. The communication channel
is under Eve’s control, and the output detections provide
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FIG. 1: Reduction to Gaussian two-mode attacks. (a) Alice
Gaussianly modulates N coherent states |αk〉 in an indepen-
dent and identical fashion. These are sent through a quan-
tum channel (Eve) and received by Bob, whose measurements
provide the classical variables βk for k = 1, ..., N . Eve’s gen-
eral eavesdropping is based on a global unitary operation, U ,
applied to the N instances of the one-way communication.
(b) After random permutations, the coherence of the general
attack is confined within each two-mode block. (c)Within an
arbitrary block, we show a Gaussian two-mode attack against
the protocol (in EB representation). A realistic Gaussian at-
tack is simulated by two beam splitters, with transmissivity τ ,
mixing Alice’s signals, A and A′, with Eve’s ancillary modes,
e and E, belonging to a larger set of modes {e,E,E′′} in her
hands. The reduced state of modes e and E is Gaussian with
thermal noise ω and correlation matrix G as in Eq. (4).
Bob with classical outcomes βk. AfterN uses of the chan-
nel, the parties share two correlated random sequences of
symbols given by the sets {αk} and {βk}.
For the sake of clarity, we consider reverse reconcili-
ation (RR), so that the key is obtained by Alice infer-
ring Bob’s variables. Now, when Bob applies homodyne
detections, randomly switching between measurements
on quadrature qˆk and pˆk, we have the switching proto-
col [16]. By contrast, when Bob measures both quadra-
tures (heterodyne detection), we have the no-switching
protocol [17]. Here we discuss the latter case, while we
leave the analysis of the switching protocol in Appendix
B.
In a general attack, Eve applies a global unitary op-
eration U , which coherently process her ancillary modes
with all the N signals exchanged by the parties, with
the ancillary outputs stored in a quantum memory. One
has that Bob-Eve joint system is described by a quantum
state in the following form
ρ = U(
N⊗
k=1
|αk〉〈αk| ⊗ |Φ〉Eve〈Φ|)U †, (1)
where |Φ〉Eve is Eve’s total input state. The security
analysis considering this general scenario is not a prac-
tically solvable problem but, in the limit of N → ∞,
it has been proved [33, 34] that one can get rid of the
cross-correlations between different uses of the channel.
More specifically, with no loss of generality, the security
analysis can be simplified by applying symmetric random
permutations on the input ({αk}) and output ({βk}) clas-
sical data-sets.
Note that Alice and Bob may arrange the signals into
two-mode blocks cj , with j = 1, ..., N/2. Then, they
can apply random permutations over the blocks cj rather
than over the single uses of the channel. After such a
symmetrization, the quantum state given in Eq. (1) can
be rewritten as the following tensor product
ρ ≃
M⊗
j=1
ρblock, (2)
where M = N/2 is large. After this symmetrization,
the initial global coherence of quantum state of Eq. (1)
is reduced to that one enclosed within each two-mode
state ρblock, associated with the arbitrary block cj, as also
depicted in Fig. 1 (b). Thus, the only effective coherence
to consider is two-mode and this scenario can be further
simplified using the extremality of Gaussian states [36].
In other words, the previous assumptions allow us to
reduce the general eavesdropping strategy to a Gaussian
two-mode attack within each block. In particular, we
may consider the most realistic form of such an attack,
where Eve exploits two beam splitters to combine Alice’s
signals with correlated ancillas prepared in an arbitrary
Gaussian state. See Fig. 1(c). Note that this is a re-
duction which is often considered in practice. The secu-
rity analysis of one-way CV-QKD protocols under col-
lective (single-mode) Gaussian attacks [37] is typically
restricted to the most practical case of entangling-cloner
attacks, resulting in thermal-loss channels between Al-
ice and Bob. The optimal key rate achievable over this
channel has been recently upper-bounded in Ref. [31] and
lower-bounded in Ref. [38].
3III. ENTANGLEMENT-BASED
REPRESENTATION AND GAUSSIAN
TWO-MODE ATTACKS
The security analysis is performed in the entangle-
ment based (EB) representation [15, 39], as also shown
in Fig. 1(c). Alice owns a source of two-mode squeezed
vacuum (TMSV) states. These are zero-mean Gaussian
states with covariance matrix (CM) of the form
VEPR =
(
µI
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z µI
)
, (3)
where µ > 1, I =diag(1, 1) and Z =diag(1,−1). In each
block, Alice’s input state is Gaussian of the form ρaA ⊗
ρa′A′ and CM VEPR⊕VEPR. The signal coherent states
|α〉 and |α′〉 are remotely projected on modes, A and A′,
by applying heterodyne detections on local modes a and
a′. In this way Alice modulates the amplitudes α and
α′ according to a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
variance µ− 1 (which is typically large).
As previously mentioned, we assume a realistic Gaus-
sian two-mode attack where Eve employs two identical
beam-splitters with transmissivity τ . These are used to
mix Alice’s input modes, A and A′, with Eve’s ancil-
lary modes, e and E, respectively. The latter belong to
a larger set of ancillary states {e, E,E′′} owned by the
eavesdropper. The reduced Gaussian state σeE is com-
pletely determined by the following CM [40]
VeE =
(
ωI G
G ωI
)
, for G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
, (4)
where ω = 2n¯ + 1 quantifies Eve’s thermal noise, with
n¯ mean number of thermal photons. The correlations
between modes e and E are described by the parameters
g and g′ in the matrix G. Their values are bounded by
the constraints
|g| < ω, |g′| < ω, and ω |g + g′| ≤ ω2 + gg′ − 1, (5)
which are imposed by the the uncertainty principle
[27, 40]. Note that from the CM of Eq. (4), one can re-
cover the standard collective attack scenario (single mode
attack) for g = g′ = 0.
In the ideal case of perfect RR efficiency, the key-rate
(bit per channel use) is defined as
R =
IAB − IE
2
, (6)
where IAB is the mutual information between variables
{α, β} and {α′, β′} and IE is Eve’s accessible information
on Bob’s variables (factor 2 accounts for the double use
of the channel within each block). For many uses of the
channel N ≫ 1, IE is bounded by the Holevo information
χ = SE − SE|ββ′ = SAB − SA|ββ′ . (7)
Here SE is the entropy of Eve’s reduced state ρE which is
equal to the entropy SAB of Alice and Bob’s joint state
ρAB = ρaa′BB′ (because the global state of Alice, Bob
and Eve is pure). Then, SE|ββ′ is the entropy of Eve’s
state ρE|ββ′ conditioned on Bob variables β and β
′; Be-
cause these are the outcomes of a rank-1 measurement,
we have that Alice’s conditional state ρA|ββ′ has entropy
SA|ββ′ = SE|ββ′.
Nore that, for Gaussian states, the von Neumann en-
tropy S(.) can be computed via the formula
S :=
∑
xh(x), (8)
where x are symplectic eigenvalues [15] and
h(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
x+ 1
2
− x− 1
2
log2
x− 1
2
, (9)
By replacing IE in Eq. (6) with the Holevo function of
Eq. (7), one obtains the following ideal key-rate (in RR)
R :=
IAB − χ
2
. (10)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Mutual Information
As a consequence of the two-mode reduction strategy,
Alice and Bob’s mutual information is given by
IAB = I + I
′, (11)
where I := I(α, β) is the contribution from the first chan-
nel use, and I ′ := I(α′, β′) from the second use. Each
contribution is given by the following expression
I(′) = log2
VB + 1
VB|α(α′) + 1
, (12)
where VB = τµ+(1− τ)ω describes the quadrature vari-
ance of the average thermal state arriving at Bob’s side,
while VB|α = VB|α′ = τ +(1−τ)ω is the quadrature vari-
ance of Bob’s state after Alice’s heterodyne detection.
Using these relations in Eqs. (11) and (12), and working
in the limit of µ≫ 1, one easily obtains
IAB = 2 log2
τµ
1 + τ + (1− τ)ω . (13)
We note that, as one would expect, this expression does
not depend on the correlation parameters g and g′.
B. Holevo Bound
We now describe the general steps to obtain the Holevo
bound χ (more details are in Appendix A). Working
in the EB representation, Alice and Bob’s joint state
ρaa′BB′ is described by the following CM
V =


(µ+ 1)I ΦZ
(µ+ 1)I ΦZ
ΦZ ΛI (1 − τ)G
ΦZ (1− τ)G ΛI

 , (14)
4where we have set
Λ := τ(µ + 1) + (1− τ)ω, (15)
Φ :=
√
τ [(µ + 1)2 − 1], (16)
The symplectic spectrum is obtained from the ordinary
eigenvalues of matrix |iΩVtot| [15] with
Ω = ω ⊕ ω, ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (17)
In the limit of large µ, and after some simple algebra,
we find the following symplectic eigenvalues
ν+ =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (18)
ν− =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (19)
ν1 = ν2 = (1− τ)µ. (20)
Using these eigenvalues and the expansion
h(x) ≃ log2
e
2
x+O
(
x−1
)
, (21)
we find the following expression for Alice and Bob’s von
Neumann entropy
SAB = h(ν+) + h(ν−) + 2 log2
e
2
(1− τ)µ. (22)
The next step is to apply two sequential heterodyne
detections on modes B and B′, to obtain the condi-
tional CM VC describing the conditional quantum state
ρaa′|ββ′ . The corresponding CM has a complicated ex-
pression that can be found in Eq. (A11) of Appendix A.
Computing its symplectic eigenvalues in the limit of
µ≫ 1, we find the following conditional spectrum
{ν¯+, ν¯−} =
{√
λ+λ′+
τ
,
√
λ−λ′−
τ
}
, (23)
where we have defined
λ± := 1 + (1 − τ)(ω ± g), (24)
λ′± := 1 + (1 − τ)(ω ± g′). (25)
The conditional entropy just reads
SA|ββ′ = h(ν¯+) + h(ν¯−). (26)
Finally, using Eqs. (22) and (26) in Eq. (7), we can write
Eve’s Holevo bound as
χ = 2 log2
e
2
(1 − τ)µ+
∑
i=±
[h(νi)− h(ν¯i)] . (27)
It is easy to check that Eq. (27) recovers the expression
of the Holevo bound of standard collective (single-mode)
Gaussian attacks for g = g′ = 0.
C. Secret key rate and its analysis
It is easy to compute the secret-key rate using Eq. (13)
and (27) in Eq. (10). After some algebra, we obtain the
following expression for the rate of the no-switching pro-
tocol under realistic Gaussian two-mode attacks
R = log2
2
e
τ
(1 − τ)[1 + τ + (1− τ)ω]
+
1
2
∑
i=±
[h(ν¯i)− h(νi)] . (28)
In order to prove that Gaussian two-mode attacks with
non-zero correlations are strictly less effective than single-
mode attacks, we study the derivatives of this rate. We
find the following strict inequality
R(τ, ω, g, g′) > R(τ, ω, 0, 0), ∀g, g′ 6= 0. (29)
The details of the proof are in Appendix A, while here
we limit the discussion to the general ideas. To show
Eq. (29), we first seek for critical points of the function
R(τ, ω, g, g′). Solving the equation∇R = 0 on the (g, g′)-
plane, one finds that only the origin P0 := (0, 0) is crit-
ical. To determine the nature of P0, we then compute
the second-order derivatives with respect the correlation
parameters g and g′. This allows us to compute the ex-
pression of the Hessian matrix H and study its positive
definiteness. We therefore find that P0 corresponds to
the absolute minimum of the rate in Eq. (28) within the
domain defined by Eq. (5).
Finally we check that the attacks over the boundary,
given by the condition ω |g + g′| = ω2+ gg′− 1, also pro-
vide key rates which are strictly larger than that under
the single-mode attack. In Fig. 2 we show a numerical
example, which is obtained by fixing the transmissivity
τ ≃ 0.44, the thermal noise ω = 1.2, and plotting the
rate as a function of g and g′. We see that the secret-
key rate under single-mode attack (red dot) is always
strictly less than that the rate which is obtained by any
physically-permitted two-mode attack (which is a point
in the colored surface). The key rates for the attacks on
the boundary of this region are the blue dots. The origin
P0 is therefore always an absolute minimum for R. As
a consequence, any correlation injected into the channels
by the eavesdropper to implement the coherent attack
automatically increases the key rate.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have explicitly studied the security of
one-way CV-QKD protocols against Gaussian two-mode
attacks. The approach is based on an attack-reduction
strategy where the parties pack the uses of the quantum
channel in two-mode blocks. Then, they apply random
permutations over these blocks. This allows them to get
rid of any cross correlation engineered by the eavesdrop-
per between different blocks. We solved this problem
5FIG. 2: We analyze the key-rate of Eq. (28) over the plane
of the correlation parameters, g and g′. Any two-mode at-
tack corresponds to a point in the colored surface. Boundary
attacks, verifying the condition ω|g + g′| = ω2 + gg′ − 1, are
represented by the blue points. The rate of the single-mode
attack g = g′ = 0 is the red spot. Here we fix τ ≃ 0.44 and
ω = 1.2. For these values, the single-mode attack provides
zero key-rate. On the other hand, we see that the key rate is
positive for any two-mode attack with non-zero correlations.
analytically, and we obtained the secret-key rates under
Gaussian two-mode attacks, in particular, those more re-
alistic and based on a suitable combination of entangling
cloners.
We have then showed that any non-zero correlation
used by the eavesdropper leads to a strictly higher key-
rate than the rate obtained under Gaussian single-mode
attacks. This is achieved under the condition that infinite
signals are exchanged (asymptotic rate), therefore not
considering composable or finite-size analyses [42]. We
conjecture that the use of correlations is not effective even
when the size of the blocks is greater than two modes. It
would be interesting to check if this is still true if Alice
adopted correlated encodings between different uses of
the channel [43].
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been supported by the EPSRC via
the ‘UK Quantum Communications HUB’ (Grant no.
EP/M013472/1).
Appendix A: Computations for the no-switching
protocol
Here we provide the calculations to prove Eq. (29) for
the no-switching protocol.
1. Total covariance matrix
Let X = (qˆX , pˆX) be the vectorial quadrature operator
describing a general mode X . The impact of the attenu-
ation and noise on the Alice’s modes, A and A′, through
two identical beam splitters of transmissivity τ are given
by the following expressions
B =
√
τA+
√
1− τe, (A1)
B
′ =
√
τA′ +
√
1− τE, (A2)
where e and E are the vectorial quadrature operators
describing Eve’s ancillary modes, e and E, mixed at the
beam splitters with modes A and A′, respectively. Eve’s
reduced state σeE is zero-mean Gaussian with CM as
in Eq. (4), with local thermal noise ω and correlation
parameters G := diag(g, g′) fulfilling the constraints of
Eq. (5). We order Alice and Bob’s output modes as
follows a, a′, B,B′; then, we use Eqs. (A1) and (A2) to
compute the CM describing Alice and Bob’s total state
ρaa′BB′ . It is simple to derive the following expression
V =


(µ+ 1)I ΦZ
(µ+ 1)I ΦZ
ΦZ ΛI (1− τ)G
ΦZ (1− τ)G ΛI

 ,
(A3)
where µ − 1 is the classical Gaussian modulation, while
Λ and Φ are defined in Eqs. (15) and (16).
2. Alice and Bob’s mutual information
In the no-switching protocol, Bob performs heterodyne
detections measuring both quadratures qˆ and pˆ. From
the form of the attack, we have that the variances in qˆ
and pˆ, relative to both Bob’s modes B and B′, are iden-
tical and given by VB = Λ, with Λ specified in Eq. (15).
The conditional variances, after Alice’s heterodyne de-
tections, are given by
VB|α,α′ = τ + (1 − τ)ω. (A4)
Accounting for the double use of the channel within the
block, we derive the mutual information
IAB = 2 log2
VB + 1
VB|α,α′ + 1
. (A5)
Taking the limit of large modulation (µ ≫ 1), one gets
the asymptotic expression of the mutual information,
given in Eq. (13) of the main text, i.e.,
IAB = 2 log2
τ(µ + 1) + (1− τ)ω + 1
1 + τ + (1− τ)ω
µ→∞→ 2 log2
τµ
1 + τ + (1 − τ)ω . (A6)
63. Computation of the Holevo bound
The EB representation and dilation of the two-mode
channel allows us to describe the joint Alice-Bob-Eve out-
put state as pure. Noting that this quantum state is al-
ways processed by rank-1 measurements, one has that
the purity is also preserved on the conditional state af-
ter detection. The eavesdropper is assumed to control the
quantummemory storing her ancillary modes, she is com-
putationally unbounded, but the parties exchange an in-
finite number of signals, N ≫ 1. In this regime Eve’s ac-
cessible information IE on Bob’s variables is bounded by
the Holevo quantity χ. It can be obtained from the von
Neumann entropy of Alice-Bob total state S(ρaa′BB′),
and the conditional von Neumann entropy S(ρaa′|ββ′).
The Holevo bound is then given by
χ = S(ρaa′BB′)− S(ρaa′|ββ′). (A7)
We need to derive the function χ in terms of the rele-
vant parameters of the protocol τ , ω, g, and g′. We then
compute the symplectic spectrum of the total CM given
by Eq. (A3), from the absolute value of the eigenvalues
of the matrix M = iΩVtot, where Ω = ⊕4k=1ω is the
8× 8 (four modes) symplectic form [15]. For large µ, one
obtains the following expressions
ν+ =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (A8)
ν− =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (A9)
ν1 = ν2 = (1− τ)µ, (A10)
which, together with Eq. (8) and Eq. (21), are used to
calculate the total von Neumann entropy S(ρaa′BB′) =
SAB given in Eq. (22).
Now, the conditional CM VC , providing the condi-
tional von Neumann entropy, is obtained via heterodyn-
ing Bob’s modes B and B′. We apply the formula for
heterodyne detection [41] to the total CM V. After some
algebra, VC can be written in the following form
VC =
1
(Λ + 1)2 − g2(1− τ)2


k k˜
k′ k˜′
k˜ k
k˜′ k′

 , (A11)
with the matrix entries defined as
k := (µ+ 1)[g2(1− τ)2 + (Λ + 1)Λ˜] + (Λ + 1)τ, (A12)
k˜ := −g(1− τ)τµ(µ + 2), (A13)
Λ˜ := Λ− τ, (A14)
k′ := k(g → g′), (A15)
k˜′ := k˜(g → g′). (A16)
For large µ, the symplectic spectrum of the conditional
CM VC is given by Eq. (23). Note that this spectrum
does not depend on the modulation µ, and for g = g′ = 0
we recover the conditional eigenvalues of Ref. [17].
Now, from Eq. (23), we derive the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy S(ρaa′|ββ′) = SA|ββ′ given in Eq. (26).
Combining the computed entropies, we obtain the Holevo
bound in Eq. (27). Finally, including the mutual infor-
mation of Eq. (A6), we derive the asymptotic key rate
RBlock = log2
4
e2
τ2
(1 − τ)2[1 + τ + (1− τ)ω]2 (A17)
+
∑
k=±
[h(ν¯k)− h(νk)] .
More precisely, for channel use, we find
R =
RBlock
2
, (A18)
as given in Eq. (28).
4. Study of the critical point
From the first-order derivatives ∂gR and ∂g′R, and
solving the equation ∇R = 0, one finds a single criti-
cal point P0 for any τ and ω; this is given by the origin
(g = g′ = 0) of the correlation plane (g, g′), bounded
by the constraints given by Eq. (5). We then take the
second-order derivative ∂2R, with respect to g and g′,
and build the (symmetric) Hessian matrix
H =
(
∂2gR ∂
2
gg′R
∂2g′gR ∂
2
g′R
)
. (A19)
From the positive definiteness of this matrix, evaluated in
the critical point P0, one has that P0 is an absolute min-
imum. We then study the sign, in P0, of the determinant
of the Hessian matrix (A19).
After some algebra one can write it in the simplified
form
detH =
D1 −D2
τ
[
λ¯+ τ
]
λ¯ω(ω2 − 1) (A20)
where we have defined
f(x) :=
1
log2 e
log2
1 + x
1− x (> 0 for 0 < x < 1) (A21)
D1 := τ
[
f
(
ω−1
)
+ 2 log2
λ¯+ τ
(1− τ)√ω2 − 1
]
, (A22)
D2 := ω
[
f
(
τλ¯−1
)
+ τ2 log2
λ¯+ τ
λ¯+ τ − 2
]
, (A23)
λ¯ := 1 + ω(1− τ). (A24)
One can check that f
(
τλ¯−1
) ≥ 0, and D1 > D2 for any
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and ω ≥ 1. Indeed, being both attenuation τ
and noise ω positive quantities, as well as λ¯, we have
detH > 0 for any τ and ω. (A25)
We then proceed with the study of the second-order
derivative ∂2gR at the critical point P0. This is the first
7principal minor of the Hessian matrix of Eq. (A19). It is
easy to check the following chain of inequalities
∂2gR =
1(
τ + λ¯
)
(ω2 − 1) +
f(ω−1)
4ω
+
(1− τ)2
4τλ¯
f(τλ¯−1)
>
1(
τ + λ¯
)
(ω2 − 1) +
f(ω−1)
4ω
>
1
(τ + λ¯)(ω2 − 1) > 0, ∀ω > 1 and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1
(A26)
Therefore, the extremal point P0 is an absolute minimum
for the key rate of the no-switching protocol.
By contrast, we notice that the study described above
is only valid for the pairs (g, g′) for which it is possi-
ble to define the derivatives, i.e., those lying within the
domain bounded by the constraints of Eq. (5). In order
to complete our analysis we check that also the points
at the boundary of the domain, described by Eq. (5),
give a key rate which is larger than that one obtained
for g = g′ = 0. We have studied numerically these cases,
computing the rate for the pairs (g, g′) fulfilling the con-
dition ω |g + g′| = ω2 + gg′ − 1. In Fig. 2 we show an
example of this computation, corresponding to the case
of a transmissivity τ ≃ 0.44 and thermal noise ω = 1.3,
in shot-noise unit (SNU). We see that the rate for single-
mode collective attack (red spot) lies well below the blue
points, which describe the key rate for the boundary two-
mode attackes. The colored region gives the values of the
key rate for any non-zero correlations g, g′.
Clearly, similar results are obtained for any other value
of 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and ω ≥ 1, with the area describing two-
mode attacks vanishing into a point as ω → 1. In that
case, the only possible attack is single-mode and, accord-
ing to Eq. (5), we have g, g′ → 0.
Appendix B: Switching protocol
In this section, we analyze the key rate and its critical
point for the switching protocol. We arrive at the same
conclusion obtained for the no-switching protocol. In this
case Bob performs homodyne detections on the received
signals modes, by randomly switching the quadratures
measured. Within each block cj , Bob can decide to apply
the same homodyne detection on both modes B,B′, or
measure on two distinct bases (qˆ and pˆ). Here we assume
the former case. When Bob detects both his modes in
quadrature qˆ, we have
V
q
C = µI−
τ(µ2 − 1)
Λ˜[g2(1− τ)2 − Λ˜2]
×


2g2(1 − τ)2 − Λ˜2 g(1− τ)Λ˜
1
g(1− τ)Λ˜ Λ˜2
1

 , (B1)
where Λ˜ = τµ + (1 − τ)ω = Λ − τ . When Bob detects
both his modes in quadrature pˆ, we obtain
V
p
C = µI−
τ(µ2 − 1)
Λ˜[g′2(1− τ)2 − Λ˜2]
×


1
2g′2(1 − τ)2 − Λ˜2 g′(1− τ)Λ˜
1
g′(1− τ)Λ˜ Λ˜2

 . (B2)
In the first case (qˆ-detection), for large µ, we obtain
the following symplectic spectrum
ν˜± =
√
(1− τ)(ω ± g)µ
τ
, (B3)
which depends on the correlation parameter g. In the sec-
ond case (pˆ-detection), we have the following symplectic
eigenvalues
ν˜′± =
√
(1− τ)(ω ± g′)µ
τ
, (B4)
depending on correlation parameter g′. From Eqs. (B3)
and (B4), we compute two distinct conditional von Neu-
mann entropies,
SE|βqβ′q = h (ν˜+) + h (ν˜−)
µ→∞
= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
(ω + g)(ω − g)µ, (B5)
and
SE|βpβ′p = h
(
ν˜′+
)
+ h
(
ν˜′−
)
µ→∞
= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
(ω + g′)(ω − g′)µ. (B6)
To the conditional von Neumann entropy, we average
over these two cases, getting the expression
SE|ββ′ =
SE|βqβ′q + SE|βpβ′p
2
= log2
e2
4
1− τ
τ
√
ν−ν+µ. (B7)
1. Key rate for the switching protocol
Using the total von Neumann entropy of Eq. (22), the
conditional entropy of Eq. (B7), and the asymptotic ex-
pression of the mutual information for the switching pro-
tocol
IAB → 2 log2
τµ
τ + (1− τ)ω , (B8)
we compute the following expression of the key-rate
against Gaussian two-mode coherent attacks
R˜ =
1
2
log2
√
ν−ν+
(1− τ)[τ + (1 − τ)ω] −
h (ν+) + h (ν−)
2
,
(B9)
8from which we can recover the standard case of single-
mode collective attack setting g = g′ = 0.
For the sake of completeness, here we also discuss the
case where Bob applies different homodyne detections
(one in qˆ, the other in pˆ), within each two-mode block. In
this case one finds a lower key rate because measurements
have the effect of de-correlating modes B and B′. As a
result, any dependency on g, g′ is cancelled from the
conditional CM, and for µ ≫ 1 one finds the following
doubly degenerate eigenvalues
ν˜1,2 =
√
(1− τ)ωµ
τ
. (B10)
After some algebra we obtain the following non-optimal
key rate
R¯ =
1
2
log2
ω
(1− τ)[τ + (1− τ)ω] −
h (ν+) + h (ν−)
2
,
(B11)
which is not interesting from a practical point of view,
because the parties can always choose to group instances
of the protocol with the same quadrature homodyned.
2. Study of the critical point for the switching
protocol
We then compute the first derivatives of the rate in
Eq. (B9), with respect to the correlations parameters g
and g′, obtaining the following
∂gR˜ =
ζ
4
[
f(ν−1− ) +
g
(ω + g)ν−
− ν+ν−f(ν
−1
+ )
(ω + g)(ω − g′)
]
(B12)
∂g′R˜ =
ζ′
4
[
f(ν−1− ) +
g′
(ω + g′)ν−
− ν+ν−f(ν
−1
+ )
(ω + g′)(ω − g)
]
,
(B13)
where the function f(.) has been defined in Eq. (A21),
and the symplectic eigenvalues ν± are given in Eqs. (A8)
and (A9), while we defined ζ and ζ′ as follows
ζ :=
ν−
2(ω − g′) , ζ
′ :=
ν−
2(ω − g) . (B14)
Note that these derivatives are properly defined within
the constraints of Eq. (5), that identify a sector of (g, g′)-
plane for which the conditions ν− > 1 and ν+ > 1 must
hold. In fact, the situation for which one has ν± = 1 can
only be obtained in P0, i.e., if the attack is collective.
Solving the system of equations ∇R = 0 one finds that
P0 is a critical point, and that it is also unique for any
ω ≥ 1 and g and g′ fulfilling Eq. (5).
3. Positive definiteness of the Hessian matrix
The second-order derivatives with respect g, evaluated
in P0, is given by
∂2g R˜ = −
ω2 + g2
4 (ω2 − g2)2 +
1
8
[
κ+
ν2+ − 1
− κ−
ν2− − 1
]
+
1
8
[√
κ+f(ν
−1
+ )
ω + g
−
√
κ−f(ν
−1
− )
ω − g
]
(B15)
with the coefficients κ± defined as follows
κ+ :=
ω + g′
ω + g
, κ− :=
ω − g′
ω − g , (B16)
The derivative with respect to g′ and the mixed deriva-
tives are given by the expressions
∂2g′R˜ = −
ω2 + g′2
4 (ω2 − g′2)2 +
1
8
[
κ−1+
ν2+ − 1
− κ
−1
−
ν2− − 1
]
+
1
8
[
f(ν−1+ )√
κ+(ω + g′)
− f(ν
−1
− )√
κ−(ω − g′)
]
(B17)
∂2g,g′ R˜ = ∂
2
g′,gR˜
=
1
8
[
1
ν2+ − 1
− 1
ν2− − 1
+
f(ν−1+ )
ν+
− f(ν
−1
− )
ν−
]
,
(B18)
which evaluated in P0, give
∂2g R˜ = ∂
2
g′R˜ =
1
4
(
1
ω2(ω2 − 1) + ω
−1f(ω−1)
)
,
(B19)
∂2g,g′R˜ = ∂
2
g′,gR˜ =
1
4
(
1
ω2 − 1 − ω
−1f(ω−1)
)
. (B20)
We then compute the determinant of the Hessian in P0,
obtaining the following expression
detH = ∂2g R˜× ∂2g′R˜− (∂2g,g′ R˜)2
=
(
ω2 + 1
) (
2ωf(ω−1)− 1)
16ω4 (ω2 − 1) , (B21)
which is always positive because
f(ω−1) >
1
ω
, for ω ≥ 1 . (B22)
We have also checked that detH > 0 in the limit of
ω → 1+. Finally we have verified that the second-order
derivative of Eq. (B19) is positive in P0. In fact, for
ω > 1, one always has
1
4
(
1
ω2(ω2 − 1) + ω
−1f(ω−1)
)
> 0. (B23)
Therefore, P0 is a point of absolute minimum for the key-
rate of Eq. (B9), so that Eq. (29) is also verified for the
switching protocol.
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